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THE FLIGHT FROM ARBITRATION: AN EMPIRICAL
STUDY OF EX ANTE ARBITRATION CLAUSES
IN THE CONTRACTS OF PUBLICLY
HELD COMPANIES
Theodore Eisenberg* and Geoffrey P. Miller**
INTRODUCTION
Informed parties bargaining for their mutual advantage will tend to
agree to provisions that maximize the social surplus. Such bargaining
includes provisions regarding the resolution of disputes that might
arise under the contract. Thus, if a form of alternative dispute resolu-
tion, such as binding arbitration, provides greater social benefits than
litigation, the dynamics of the process should tend to induce the par-
ties to include a clause submitting future disputes to arbitration.' This
Article studies the actual contracting practices of large, sophisticated
actors with respect to arbitration clauses. We examined over 2800
contracts, filed with the Securities Exchange Commission (SEC) in
2002 by public firms, for the presence of contract terms requiring arbi-
tration. Little evidence was found to support the proposition that
these parties routinely regard arbitration clauses as efficient or other-
wise desirable contract terms. The vast majority of contracts did not
require arbitration; only about 11% of the contracts did.
Although the results reported here test hypotheses about the fre-
quency of arbitration clause use, the findings do not provide definitive
answers as much as they generate more hypotheses. The surprisingly
low frequency of arbitration clauses, and their varying frequency
across contract types, generate questions about the characteristics of
* Henry Allen Mark Professor of Law, Cornell Law School.
** Stuyvesant P. Comfort Professor of Law, NYU Law School. We thank Edward Brunet,
Christopher Drahozal, John Duffy, Samuel Estreicher, Mark Geistfeld, Florencia Marotta-Wur-
gler, Henry S. Noyes, Stephen Ware, and participants at the Twelfth Annual Clifford Symposium
at DePaul University College of Law for comments, and Natalie Erbe, Jeremy Masys, Sergio
Muro, Hilel Pohulanik, Whitney Schwab, and Cathy Weist for research assistance.
1. See, e.g., Keith N. Hylton, Agreements to Waive or to Arbitrate Legal Claims: An Economic
Analysis, 8 Sup. CT. ECON. REV. 209, 222 (2000) (arguing that if the option to litigate reduces the
joint wealth of contracting parties, market forces will push them toward alternative forms of
dispute resolution); Steven Shavell, Alternative Dispute Resolution: An Economic Analysis, 24 J.
LEGAL STUD. 1, 5 (1995) (contending that "parties would tend to adopt ADR if it would lead to
mutual advantages").
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the parties, their contracts, and their attorneys that should be the ob-
ject of future modeling and research. For now, we interpret our find-
ings as evidence that sophisticated actors prefer litigation to
arbitration, encounter obstacles to negotiating mutually satisfactory
contract terms that include arbitration clauses, or some combination
of these factors.
Part II of this Article sets forth the hypotheses about arbitration
clauses that were tested. Part III describes the data, and Part IV re-
ports the results. Part V discusses these results, and Part VI offers
some tentative conclusions.
II. HYPOTHESES AND EXISTING RESEARCH
A. Arbitration Clauses Generally
One view of arbitration suggests that sophisticated parties bargain-
ing to maximize surplus from trade would adopt binding arbitration
clauses in their contracts nearly as a matter of course.2 Arbitration is
often said to be cheaper than litigation.3 It can be completed more
2. See, e.g., NAT'L ARBITRATION FORUM, THE CASE FOR PRE-DISPUTE ARBITRATION AGREE-
MENTS: EFFECTIVE AND AFFORDABLE ACCESS TO JUSTICE FOR CONSUMERS EMPIRICAL STUD-
IES AND SURVEY RESULTS 1 (2004), available at http://www.adrforum.com/rcontrol/documents/
ResearchStudiesAndStatistics/2004EmpiricalStudies.pdf [hereinafter CASE FOR PRE-DISPUTE
ARBITRATION AGREEMENTS] (asserting that "[m]any independent studies ... have confirmed
the comparative benefits of arbitration (versus lawsuits) for both businesses and consumers").
3. See, e.g., Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265, 280 (1995) (citing H.R. REP.
No. 97-542, at 13 (1982), as reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 765, 777); Gilmer v. Interstate/John-
son Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 31 (1991); Thomas J. Stipanowich, ADR and the "Vanishing Trial":
The Growth and Impact of "Alternative Dispute Resolution," 1 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 843,
876 (2004). Arbitration proponents frequently tout its benefits relative to litigation. See, e.g.,
Eric J. Mogilnicki & Kirk D. Jensen, Arbitration and Unconscionability, 19 GA. ST. U. L. REV.
761 (2003). One author listed the "inherent advantages" of arbitration:
(1) the preparation, filing, and service of claims and responses are much easier and
faster, (2) relevant and reliable information can be or is more effectively exchanged
between parties before a hearing, (3) there is no need for costly and lengthy motion
proceedings, (4) parties can, when they are able to, represent themselves or choose to
have an attorney represent them, (5) the rules are much fewer in number and much
easier to understand, (6) the rules of evidence readily allow relevant and reliable infor-
mation and do not restrict or complicate the admission of evidence, (7) the hearing
procedures are more informal and less complex, (8) the arbitrator or administrative
judge is a procedural and substantive law expert, (9) the arbitrator and administrative
judge have more flexibility in allowing the parties to present the information they need
to present, (10) the type of hearing can vary and allow parties and witnesses to partici-
pate by written documents, telephone, e-mail, video conference, and by personal ap-
pearance, (11) the day and time of the hearing can be specifically scheduled assuring
parties that their case will be heard as scheduled, and (12) the entire proceeding, from
beginning to end, may take a few months instead of years.
Roger S. Haydock, Civil Justice and Dispute Resolution in the Twenty-First Century: Mediation
and Arbitration Now and for the Future, 27 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 745, 748-49 (2000). Studies
of arbitration in the employment context tend to confirm some of these beliefs. See Theodore
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quickly,4 it can lower risks, 5 it can involve limited discovery,6 it avoids
the risk of overly generous awards handed out by judges and juries, 7
and it can be used in large class actions.8 Procedural disputes can be
resolved by informal, flexible procedures. 9 Limited judicial review of
arbitration awards reduces the costs of the procedure,10 although it
also increases the risk of an erroneous award.11
Eisenberg & Elizabeth Hill, Arbitration and Litigation of Employment Claims: An Empirical
Comparison, 58 Disp. RESOL. J. 44 (2003-2004) (finding faster case processing in arbitration):
U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION: EMPLOYERS' EXPER-
IENCES wITH ADR IN THE WORKPLACE 19 (1997) (finding that employers' legal fees were gener-
ally lower in arbitration); Lewis L. Maltby, The Projected Economic Impact of the Model
Employment Termination Act, 536 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. ScI. 103, 117 (1994) (finding
that legal fees in employment arbitrations were surprisingly low).
4. See, e.g., Eisenberg & Hill, supra note 3, at 51; Mogilnicki & Jensen, supra note 3, at
765-66; see also Gary G. Mathiason & Pavneet S. Uppal, Evaluating and Using Employer-Initi-
ated Arbitration Rules and Agreements, in ALI-ABA COURSE OF STUDY MATERIALS: EMPLOY-
MENT DISCRIMINATION AND CIVIL RIGHTS ACTIONS IN FEDERAL AND STATE COURTS 875, 894
(1994) (average arbitration case resolved in less than half the time required for civil litigation).
5. Shavell, supra note 1, at 5.
6. But discovery may not be dispensed with altogether, even in the commercial context. See
Cole v. Burns Int'l Sec. Servs., 105 F.3d 1465, 1482 (D.C. Cir. 1997).
7. Employers fear such jury awards. See, e.g., Alexander J.S. Colvin, From Supreme Court to
Shopfloor: Mandatory Arbitration and the Reconfiguration of Workplace Dispute Resolution, 13
CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 581, 585 (2004). Eisenberg and Hill found that in comparing arbi-
tration and litigation, median awards in the employment cases studied were roughly similar, but
mean awards were much higher in litigation, which suggests that in a few cases courts awarded
much higher damages than in similar arbitrated cases. Eisenberg & Hill, supra note 3, at 49-51.
8. Stephen J. Ware, The Case for Enforcing Adhesive Arbitration Agreements-With Particu-
lar Consideration of Class Actions and Arbitration Fees, 5 J. AM. ARB. 251. 261 (2006).
9. See Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265, 280 (1995); Gilmer v. Interstate/
Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 31 (1991); Donna K. McElroy, Compulsory Arbitration Agree-
ments . . . Issues Concerning the Enforcement of Compulsory Arbitration Agreement Between
Employers and Employees, 31 ST. MARY'S L.J. 1015, 1021 (2000).
10. The Federal Arbitration Act specifies when a commercial arbitration award may be
vacated:
(1) Where the award was procured by corruption, fraud, or undue means.
(2) Where there was evident partiality or corruption in the arbitrators ....
(3) Where the arbitrators were guilty of misconduct in refusing to postpone the hear-
ing, upon sufficient cause shown, or in refusing to hear evidence pertinent and ma-
terial to the controversy ....
(4) Where the arbitrators exceeded their powers, or so imperfectly executed them that
a mutual, final, and definite award upon the subject matter submitted was not
made.
9 U.S.C. § 10(a) (2000). Some courts have recognized nonstatutory grounds for vacating awards.
See, e.g., United Paperworkers Int'l Union v. Misco, Inc., 484 U.S. 29, 43 (1987) (public policy);
Montes v. Shearson Lehman Bros., Inc., 128 F.3d 1456, 1458 (11th Cir. 1997) (arbitrary and
capricious); Tanoma Mining Co. v. Local Union No. 1269, United Mine Workers of Am., 896
F.2d 745, 749 (3d Cir. 1990) (manifest disregard for the law).
11. Parties can try to work around this risk by providing contractually for judicial review of
arbitral decisions, but the efficacy of such contracts is not well established. See, e.g., Christopher
R. Drahozal, Contracting Around RUAA: Default Rules, Mandatory Rules, and Judicial Review
of Arbitral Awards, 3 PEPP. DisP. RESOL. L.J. 419, 426-33 & nn.19-22 (2003); Stephen J. Ware,
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Costs and risks can be further reduced because parties have choices
in arbitration that extend beyond the simple decision of whether or
not to arbitrate. The parties also enjoy broad autonomy to select the
arbitrator. The parties can assure themselves ex ante that the forum
for resolving their disputes will be relatively unbiased. Such assur-
ances may not be available in litigation, where judges and juries may
come to the case with prejudices and preconceptions that the parties
cannot control. Some argue that because arbitrators compete to be
selected by the parties, they have an incentive to develop reputations
for fidelity to the parties' positions. 12 Furthermore, parties may spec-
ify the rules governing the arbitration proceedings, 13 control the
schedule of hearings,' 4 specify the applicable law,15 specify the rules of
evidence, and determine the law governing the interpretation of the
arbitration clause itself.' 6 The parties may even be able to determine
contractually the finality of the arbitrator's decision 17-although this
is subject to dispute.' 8
More subtly, it has been noted that arbitration can confer an adjudi-
cative benefit relative to litigation because arbitrators may be better
than judges at detecting substandard performance by a contracting
party.19 In such cases, an arbitration clause's ex ante existence en-
"Opt-in" for Judicial Review of Errors of Law Under the Revised Uniform Arbitration Act, 8 AM.
REV. INT'L ARB. 263, 265 & n.21 (1997).
12. See Bruce H. Kobayashi & Larry E. Ribstein, Contract and Jurisdictional Freedom, in THE
FALL AND RISE OF FREEDOM OF CONTRACT 325, 329 (F.H. Buckley ed., 1999).
13. See, e.g., Green Tree Fin. Corp.-Ala. v. Randolph, 531 U.S. 79, 94-95 (2000) (Ginsburg,
J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (noting that the contract could have specified that
arbitration would be governed by the rules of the American Arbitration Association).
14. See, e.g., AM. ARBITRATION ASS'N: COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION RULES AND MEDIATION
PROCEDURES E-8 (amended and effective Sept. 15, 2005) (noting that arbitrator may schedule
additional hearings within seven business days after the initial hearing).
15. See, e.g., Hackett v. Milbank, Tweed, Hadley & McCloy, 654 N.E.2d 95, 100 (N.Y. 1995);
Bruce L. Benson, To Arbitrate or to Litigate: That Is the Question, 8 EUR. J.L. & ECON. 91, 92
(1999); Lee H. Rosenthal, One Judge's Perspective on Procedure as Contract, 80 NOTRE DAME L.
REV. 669, 673 (2005) (stating that "[t]he parties may select state law and may specifically exclude
the application of federal law"). The ability to select an applicable law is potentially limited by
the principle that the law chosen must bear some reasonable relationship to the parties or the
transaction. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 187(2); see also Curtis 1000, Inc.
v. Suess, 24 F.3d 941, 948 (7th Cir. 1994).
16. See, e.g., Pedcor Mgmt. Co. Welfare Benefit Plan v. Nations Pers. of Tex., Inc., 343 F.3d
355, 361 (5th Cir. 2005) (citing Ford v. NYLCare Health Plans of the Gulf Coast, Inc., 141 F.3d
243, 248 (5th Cir. 1998)).
17. See, e.g., LaPine Tech. Corp. v. Kyocera Corp., 130 F.3d 884 (9th Cir. 1997) (enforcing the
standard for judicial review set forth in the parties' agreement to arbitrate), overruled by Ky-
ocera Corp. v. Prudential-Bache Trade Servs., Inc., 341 F.3d 987 (9th Cir. 2003) (en banc).
18. Compare Bowen v. Amoco Pipeline Co., 254 F.3d 925, 933-37 (10th Cir. 2001), and Ky-
ocera Corp., 341 F.3d at 1000, with Gateway Techs., Inc. v. MCI Telecomms. Corp., 64 F.3d 993,
996-97 (5th Cir. 1995).
19. Shavell, supra note 1, at 6.
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courages parties to render proper performance. The expertise of arbi-
trators may supply another benefit that warrants sacrificing the
benefits of litigation. Where contracts are highly standardized-as in
the case of pooling and servicing or trust agreements-arbitration
may add value compared to litigation because expert arbitrators se-
lected by the parties might be able to give a better informed interpre-
tation of the highly specialized terms contained in these agreements.
Uncertainty about arbitration is further reduced because, as a legal
matter, little doubt exists as to the enforceability of the arbitration
clauses in our sample. The Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) provides
that arbitration agreements are enforceable "save upon such grounds
as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract. °20 This
statute preempts state laws and operates to the full extent of Con-
gress's power under the Commerce Clause.21 A plaintiff wishing to
avoid arbitration in the face of an arbitration agreement must show
that a ground "for the revocation of any contract" applies to the arbi-
tration agreement.22 The preference for arbitration expressed in the
FAA is enthusiastically endorsed by many courts as part of a general
trend towards encouraging the "outsourcing" of dispute resolution
proceedings.2 3 Some courts have even gone so far (perhaps question-
ably) as to enforce arbitration agreements involving parties who were
not privy to the contracts containing the clause.24
But skeptical views of arbitration exist, even among proponents of
the procedure. Aside from adjudication costs, some regard arbitration
as potentially inferior to litigation.25 The parties must pay the arbitra-
tors; if the chosen form of arbitration involves two party-selected arbi-
trators and a neutral one, this means paying three highly compensated
20. 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2000).
21. Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265, 272, 277 (1995).
22. 9 U.S.C. § 2.
23. See Judith Resnik, Procedure as Contract, 80 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 593 (2005).
24. Acosta v. Master Maint. & Constr., Inc., 52 F. Supp. 2d 699, 706-07 (M.D. La. 1999);
eyoub ex rel State of La. v. Am. Tobacco Co., No. 97-1174, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 24219 (W.D.
La. Sept. 11, 1997); cf. Marathon Oil Co. v. Ruhrgas, A.G., 115 F.3d 315, 320-21 (5th Cir. 1997),
vacated by 145 F.3d 211 (5th Cir. 1998). Contra Merrill Lynch Inv. Managers v. Optibase, Ltd.,
337 F.3d 125, 127-28, 131-32 (2d Cir. 2003) (holding that the investor was not entitled to compel
arbitration with its investment adviser, where the investor had an arbitration agreement with its
broker-dealer that referenced affiliates, but had no arbitration agreement with the investment
adviser itself); Zimmerman v. Int'l Cos. & Consulting, Inc., 107 F.3d 344, 346 (5th Cir. 1997)
(refusing to subject nonsignatories to arbitration clauses); In re Talbott Big Foot, Inc., 887 F.2d
611, 614 (5th Cir. 1989).
25. See, e.g., Edward Brunet, Seeking Optimal Dispute Resolution Clauses in High Stakes Em-
ployment Contracts, 23 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 107 (2002) (challenging the popular con-
ception that arbitration and mediation will be optimal for contracts between employers and
highly skilled employees).
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professionals. Judges and juries, in contrast, are paid by the govern-
ment.2 6 A trial usually has a definite beginning and end, and in the
case of jury trials, the process is compressed because of the need to
maintain the empanelled jury. A party's legal fees in arbitration are
not necessarily lower than they are in litigation.27 Nor are arbitrations
necessarily quicker than trials.2 8 Arbitration proceedings are subject
to the schedule of the arbitrator. Proceedings can be interrupted for
months at a time, only to be reconvened at significant cost to the par-
ties. Unlike judges or juries, the arbitrator, whether paid hourly or
daily, has short-term economic incentives to prolong the proceed-
ings.29 Further, if an arbitrator issues an award that is not supported
by the evidence, it may be difficult or impossible to correct the error.
The potential lack of effective appellate review makes arbitration
risky relative to litigation.30 Arbitrators may lack the ability to grant
emergency or interim relief of the sort that is available to judges under
their equitable powers. Cases that might be too expensive to litigate
may be affordable to arbitrate; a defendant might therefore find itself
paying on a claim in arbitration that would not typically generate a
lawsuit. 31 The parties cannot assume that arbitration proceedings will
be confidential or exempt from discovery in later litigation.32 Thus,
some commentators encourage attorneys drafting arbitration clauses
not to include boilerplate provisions, but rather to think carefully
about what provisions should be in the agreement. 33
Notwithstanding these skeptical views, the bulk of authority seems
to agree that arbitration is a more efficient dispute resolution proce-
dure than litigation. This generates the hypothesis that, in a data set
of contracts freely agreed to by sophisticated parties, we will almost
26. See Henry S. Noyes, If You (Re)Build It They Will Come: Contracts to Remake the Rules
of Litigation in Arbitration's Image, 30 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y (forthcoming 2007) (question-
ing whether arbitration proceedings are cheaper than trials, given the need to pay the
arbitrators).
27. See, e.g., Tom Arnold, Delay and Cost Booby Traps in Arbitration Practice and How to
Avoid Them, in ALI-ABA COURSE OF STUDY MATERIALS, ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLU-
TION: HOW TO USE IT TO YOUR ADVANTAGE 99, 103 (1996) (describing an arbitration that
lasted over seven years and generated more than $60 million in attorney's fees).
28. See Noyes, supra note 26.
29. See id.
30. See id.
31. Ware, supra note 8, at 261 (noting that small meritorious claims, some of which might not
be cost effective in litigation, may see higher awards in arbitration).
32. Richard C. Reuben, Confidentiality in Arbitration: Beyond the Myth, 55 U. KAN. L. REV.
(forthcoming 2007).
33. See, e.g., Tony Starr, Choosing Between Litigation and Arbitration, BOSTON B.J.,
Mar.-Apr. 2005, at 31.
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always observe arbitration clauses being used.34 Thus, if an arbitra-
tion clause is absent from an agreement, it is reasonable to infer that
the parties either preferred litigation over arbitration, were unable to
reach agreement despite the perceived benefits of arbitration, or were
simply indifferent. 35
The incidence of arbitration clauses, if it is significantly less than
100%, provides a rough measure of the degree to which arbitration is
perceived to provide greater efficiency in dispute resolution than liti-
gation. Thus, we hypothesize that sophisticated parties will nearly al-
ways opt for binding arbitration.
B. Arbitration Clauses in International Contractual Settings
To the degree that arbitration clauses are not uniformly adopted by
sophisticated parties, it is useful to examine the reasons why parties
select arbitration or litigation. The difference between domestic and
international contracts is one possible reason. Arbitration is viewed
as particularly valuable in the case of international contracts. Arbitra-
tion is said to have become "the preferred mechanism for resolving
international disputes. '' 36 One reason for the widespread use of arbi-
tration in commercial contracts is that people distrust the legal sys-
tems in foreign countries. 37 International arbitration awards also offer
greater certainty of enforcement than domestic legal judgments.
While other countries might not, and often do not, afford full faith and
34. We do not attribute this view to any particular scholar of arbitration, but rather advance it
as a hypothesis against which to test the evidence.
35. The parties can, of course, agree to arbitration after a dispute has arisen. Unless the par-
ties agree to arbitration before a dispute arises, however, it is doubtful that they will be able to
achieve the benefits of arbitration by subsequent agreement. Once a dispute has arisen, it is
likely that strategic factors will cause one of the parties to refuse to arbitrate, even if the other
makes a request. See CASE FOR PRE-DISPUTE ARBITRATION AGREEMENTS, supra note 2 (argu-
ing that once a dispute has occurred, at least one of the parties is likely to perceive litigation as
preferable to arbitration, and accordingly, parties in real-life disputes rarely submit their dis-
putes to arbitration); David Sherwyn, Because It Takes Two: Why Post-dispute Voluntary Arbi-
tration Programs Will Fail to Fix the Problems Associated with Employment Discrimination Law
Adjudication, 24 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 1 (2003). Accordingly, if the parties wish to
guarantee that their disputes will be decided by an arbitrator, they must, as a practical matter,
include an arbitration clause in the underlying contract.
36. Susan D. Franck, The Role of International Arbitrators, 12 ILSA J. INT'L & COMp. L. 499,
499 (2006).
37. See, e.g., Christopher R. Drahozal, Privatizing Civil Justice: Commercial Arbitration and
the Civil Justice System, 9 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 578 (2000). But empirical evidence about the
mistreatment of foreigners by U.S. courts is lacking. See Kevin M. Clermont & Theodore Eisen-
berg, Commentary, Xenophilia in American Courts, 109 HARV. L. REV. 1120 (1996); Kevin M.
Clermont & Theodore Eisenberg, Xenophilia or Xenophobia in American Courts? Before and
After 9/11, 4 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. (forthcoming 2007), available at http://ssrn.com/ab-
stract=923595.
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credit to the judgments of U.S. courts,38 arbitral decrees are widely
recognized and enforced under the New York Convention. 39 The par-
ties' choice of law may be entitled to greater respect in international
arbitrations than in domestic ones, where the court or the arbitrator
may refuse to follow the designated law because it does not bear a
reasonable relationship to the parties or the transaction. 40 Thus, a
widely held, though not universal, 41 view is that arbitration clauses are
particularly beneficial in the case of.contracts between parties located
in different countries. We hypothesize that binding arbitration will be
observed more frequently in international contracts than in domestic
contracts.
C. Standardized Contracts and Industry Practices
Some commentators have suggested that arbitration clauses will be
preferred, relative to litigation, when the rules of decision are clear
and unambiguous. 42 Further, by making standardized provisions sub-
ject to binding arbitration, a repeat player can avoid the risk of being
subject to offensive nonmutual collateral estoppel in disputes with
38. The Hague Convention on Choice of Court Agreements was concluded on June 30, 2005.
44 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 1294 (2005). If, it is ratified by enough countries, it may provide a
viable alternative to arbitration for resolving international commercial disputes.
39. United Nations Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral
Awards, June 10, 1958, 21 U.S.T. 2517, 330 U.N.T.S. 38. There are 137 signatories to the New
York Convention. William W. Park, The International Currency of Arbitral Awards, 739 PRAC-
TISING L. INST. LITIG. & ADMIN. PRAC. COURSE HANDBOOK SERIES 585, 591 (2006). The Con-
vention has been implemented in the United States. To Implement the Convention on the
Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, Pub. L. No. 91-369, 84 Stat. 692
(codified as amended at 9 U.S.C. §§ 201-208).
40. See Cindy G. Buys, The Arbitrators' Duty to Respect the Parties' Choice of Law in Com-
mercial Arbitration, 79 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 59 (2005).
41. International arbitration carries with it potentially significant costs, including the fees of
the private arbitrators and the costs of the dispute resolution forum (if any). See Linda Silber-
man, International Arbitration: Comments from a Critic, 13 AM. REV. INT'L ARB. 9 (2002).
Some claim that the virtues of international arbitration have eroded as arbitration becomes more
like litigation. Franck, supra note 36, at 500-01. It is even claimed that international arbitration
may not be less expensive than litigation, although the relative advantage of arbitration over
litigation likely varies across court systems. CHRISTIAN BOHRING-UHLE, ARBITRATION AND ME-
DIATION IN INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS 140-48 (1996) (cited in Franck, supra note 36, at 500 n.4)
(noting that arbitration is not less expensive but that it may be quicker). A recent article argues
that some classes of international disputes have become increasingly judicialized. Andrea
Schneider, Not Quite a World Without Trials: Why International Dispute Resolution Is Increas-
ingly Judicialized, J. DisP. RESOL. (forthcoming 2007), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=
920510 (arguing that judicialization of international disputes has occurred in the areas of human
rights, economic and trade disputes, and border and maritime disputes).
42. William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Adjudication as a Private Good, 8 J. LEGAL
STUD. 235, 249 (1979).
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new parties under identical contract terms.43 This suggests that we
will observe binding arbitration terms in standardized contracts. Ar-
bitration clause usage rates are likely associated with industry con-
tracting practices, which may be only partly captured by a measure of
contract-type standardization. It is likely that some industries have
developed a practice of including arbitration clauses to a greater ex-
tent than other industries. These considerations suggest the hypothe-
ses that arbitration will be more commonly observed when contracts
are standardized than when they are negotiated individually, and that
arbitration clause usage rates will vary by industry.
D. Choice of Law
The decision to require arbitration may relate to the law chosen to
govern the arbitration decisions. It is difficult to separate ex ante
whether arbitration was chosen in a particular contract because other
considerations dictated a particular choice of law, or a particular law
was chosen because of a desire to provide for arbitration. Regardless
of the direction of causation, contracting parties may regard some
state laws as providing desirable or undesirable arbitration-related
features. Therefore, one might expect to observe an association be-
tween the presence of an arbitration clause and choice of law or other
factors that will influence the choice of law.
Two classes of reasons relating to the choice of law may influence
the decision to include an arbitration clause. First, parties may agree
to arbitrate based on the perceived efficiency of a state's laws and
courts. In states in which litigated cases proceed expeditiously, con-
tracting parties may feel less pressure to include arbitration clauses.
States with slow or inefficient case processing may increase incentives
to include arbitration clauses.
Second, state laws regarding arbitration can influence the incentives
to include arbitration clauses. For example, California allows an arbi-
tration proceeding to be stayed pending the outcome of related litiga-
tion.44 It is also less receptive than most other states-including New
York-to arbitration clauses banning class actions. 45 These features
43. See Kenneth S. Abraham & J.W. Montgomery, III, The Lawlessness of Arbitration, 9
CONN. INS. L.J. 355, 364 (2003).
44. Cronus Invs., Inc. v. Concierge Servs., 107 P.3d 217, 228-29 (Cal. 2005) (holding that a
statute permitting stay of arbitration pending outcome of related litigation does not contravene
the FAA).
45. Discover Bank v. Superior Court of L.A., 113 P.3d 1100, 1116 (Cal. 2005) (limiting author-
ity to preclude class-based activity); see also Kristian v. Comcast Corp., 446 F.3d 25, 64-65 (1st
Cir. 2006) (invalidating prohibitions on treble damages, attorney's fees and costs, and class ac-
tions, and permitting waiver of Massachusetts state law antitrust claim); Jenkins v. First Am.
2007]
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might cause parties designating California law to include or not to in-
clude an arbitration clause if they regard these provisions as desirable
or undesirable. New York's highest court has held that awarding pu-
nitive damages in an arbitration proceeding violated public policy, 46 a
decision that has not been widely emulated elsewhere,47 but is still
cited by New York courts. 48 If state law varies with respect to the
enforceability or other treatment of particular arbitration provisions,
we would expect that the incidence of arbitration clauses would vary
depending on the ties between the contract in question and a state.
Our models below treat the decision to include an arbitration clause
as a function of the ties between the contract in question and a state.
The direction of the association, like the direction of causation, may
also be uncertain. Parties who strive for certainty in arbitration may
prefer the laws of states that limit judicial authority to influence the
substance or operation of arbitration proceedings. Parties who strive
for flexibility or fairness in arbitration may be less reluctant to em-
brace the laws of states more willing to allow judges to influence or
review arbitration. It is thus difficult to predict whether a particular
state's laws will be associated with the increasing or decreasing pres-
ence of arbitration clauses.
What does seem clear is that the perceived attitudes of state courts
toward arbitration, and the particular contents of a state's laws, can
influence the. decision to include an arbitration clause. For present
purposes, we hypothesize that, as described above, California's histor-
Cash Advance of Ga., L.L.C., 400 F.3d 868 (11th Cir. 2005) (discussing the question of arbi-
trability presented by ban on class actions); Livingston v. Assocs. Fin., Inc., 339 F.3d 553 (7th Cir.
2003) (same); Whitney v. Alltel Commc'ns, Inc., 173 S.W.3d 300, 309-11 (Mo. Ct. App. 2005)
(finding the class action arbitration ban unconscionable). Contra Tsadilas v. Providian Nat'l
Bank, 786 N.Y.S.2d 478, 480 (N.Y. App. Div. 2004) (finding the arbitration provision waiving
class actions enforceable).
46. Garrity v. Lyle Stuart, Inc., 40 N.Y.2d 354 (1976) (holding that the arbitration award of
punitive damages violates public policy). California courts did not follow Garrity. See Baker v.
Sadick, 208 Cal. Rptr. 676, 683-84 (Cal. Ct. App. 1984).
47. See Mastrobuono v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc., 514 U.S. 52 (1995) (finding that the
FAA preempts state law); Barnes v. Logan, 122 F.3d 820, 822-24 (9th Cir. 1997) (upholding
punitive damage award under Minnesota law); Todd Shipyards Corp. v. Cunard Line, Ltd., 943
F.2d 1056, 1062 (9th Cir. 1991) (upholding punitive award in arbitration conducted under arbi-
tration rules that allow punitive damages); Raytheon Co. v. Automated Bus. Sys., Inc., 882 F.2d
6, 12 (1st Cir. 1989) (same); Dandong Shuguang Axel Corp. v. Brilliance Mach. Co., No. C 00-
4480 SC, 2001 WL 637446, at *6 (N.D. Cal. June 1, 2001) (recognizing that the Supreme Court
has severely limited Garrity); PaineWebber, Inc. v. Landay, 903 F. Supp. 193, 204 (D. Mass.
1995) (upholding punitive damages award rendered under National Association of Securities
Dealers (NASD) rules); Drywall Sys., Inc. v. ZVI Constr. Co., 747 N.E.2d 168 (Mass. App. Ct.
2001) (rejecting Garrity).
48. In re Mohawk Valley Cmty. Coll., 814 N.Y.S.2d 428, 429 (N.Y. App. Div. 2006) (quoting
Garrity in noting that an award imposing punitive damages violates public policy).
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ically flexible attitude towards judicial involvement in arbitration 49
will attract arbitration clauses on the ground that flexibility may pro-
mote fairness in a particular case at the cost of some certainty. We do
not mean to suggest that particular arbitration clauses, such as those
relating to class actions, are necessarily relevant to each of the con-
tracts studied here. We do suggest that perceptions of a state court's
general willingness to strictly enforce arbitration clauses, as reflected
in state law, may influence decisions to include arbitration clauses.
We hypothesize that the incidence of arbitration will vary geographi-
cally, and there will be more arbitration clauses for contracts with Cal-
ifornia connections than for contracts with New York connections.
E. Relational Contracts
If arbitration is less disruptive and adversarial than litigation, then
we would expect. to see arbitration selected more frequently in rela-
tional contracts in which the parties expect to work together for a sub-
stantial period of time. Without detailed knowledge of the
relationship between the contracting parties, one cannot precisely
identify which contracts are relational and which are not. But we be-
lieve some contract categories are more likely to be relational than
others. The contract categories are described in Part III. For now, we
identify the following categories that tend to be relational: credit
commitments, employment, licensing, pooling and servicing agree-
ments, security agreements, and trust agreements. In contrast, asset
sales, bond indentures, mergers, securities purchase agreements, and
underwritings are less likely to be relational. Settlement agreements
are too ambiguous to lump with one group or the other. We hypothe-
size that arbitration clauses will be observed more frequently in rela-
tional contracts and less frequently in one-off contracts.
F Prior Research
Little information exists about arbitration clause incidence in so-
phisticated contracts; we know of no study examining as broad a range
of contracts as this study. 50 The empirical evidence that does exist
49. See also Elizabeth Rolph, Erik Moller & John E. Rolph, Arbitration Agreements in Health
Care: Myths and Reality, 60 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Winter 1997, at 153, 159 (noting that
California's "legal policies have been very supportive of arbitration agreements").
50. For a comprehensive study of arbitration clauses in end-user software license agreements,
see Florencia Marotta-Wurgler, "Unfair" Dispute Resolution Clauses: Much Ado About Noth-
ing?, in "BOILERPLATE": FOUNDATIONS OF MARKET CONTRACTS (Omri Ben-Shahar ed., forth-
coming 2007). For a call for more empirical research in the area of contract law, see David V.
Snyder, Go out and Look: The Challenge and Promise of Empirical Scholarship in Contract
Law, 80 TUL. L. REV. 1009 (2006).
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suggests that arbitration has been expanding as a dispute resolution
mechanism.5' The overall case load of the American Arbitration As-
sociation grew "from about 1000 cases in 1960 to more than 17,000 in
2002," with a decline to 15,800 in 2003.52 International arbitration is
also reported to be increasing.5 3 A 1998 Cornell University study of
Fortune 1000 companies yielded responses from more than 600 com-
panies. The study found that alternative dispute resolution (ADR)
processes are well established in corporate America, widespread in all
industries, and used for all types of disputes. ADR practice was not
haphazard or incidental, but rather seemed integral to a systematic,
long-term change in the way corporations resolve disputes.5 4
Whatever the growth rate, the Cornell study also found that arbitra-
tion is not as ubiquitous as some might believe. About 80% of the
companies stated that they had used arbitration "occasionally" or less
often; only 7.5% reported using arbitration frequently.55
Several studies look to the incidence of binding arbitration of em-
ployment disputes in the workplace. Contrary to the predictions of
theory, these studies find that employers have not overwhelmingly
adopted binding arbitration procedures over litigation, despite their
perceived benefits. A 1995 General Accounting Office Study of 1448
establishments subject to the reporting requirements of the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) found that only 9.9%
had adopted binding arbitration.5 6 Alexander Colvin's studies of the
telecommunications industry found that only 14% to 16% of firms
51. See ELIZABETH ROLPH, ERIK MOLLER & LAURA PETERSEN, ESCAPING THE COURT-
HOUSE: PRIVATE ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION IN Los ANGELES 18-20 (1994) (report-
ing that the private ADR case load in the Los Angeles area grew by an average of 15% per year
from 1988 to 1993, while the court system case load was stable); Bruce L. Benson, An Explora-
tion of the Impact of Modern Arbitration Statutes on the Development of Arbitration in the United
States, 11 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 479, 490 (1995).
52. Stipanowich, supra note 3, at 873.
53. See Data on Filings with International Arbitration Institutions, in TOWARDS A SCIENCE OF
INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION: COLLECTED EMPIRICAL RESEARCH app. 1 at 341 (Christopher
R. Drahozal & Richard W. Naimark eds., 2005) (showing that filings in a collection of interna-
tional arbitration institutions increased from 1392 in 1993 to 2577 in 2003).
54. David B. Lipsky & Ronald L. Seeber, The Appropriate Resolution of Corporate Disputes:
A Report on the Growing Use of ADR by U.S. Corporations 8 (1998) (Cornell Inst. on Conflict
Resolution), available at http://digitalcommons.irl.cornell.edu/icrpubs/4.
55. Stipanowich, supra note 3, tbl.19 at 880 (summarizing Lipsky & Seeber, supra note 54, at
8).
56. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION: MOST PRIVATE-SECTOR EM-
PLOYERS USE ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION 21 (1995). For a study using EEOC and
other data to suggest new paths for empirical research in employment arbitration, see David
Sherwyn, Samuel Estreicher & Michael Heise, Assessing the Case for Employment Arbitration:
A New Path for Empirical Research, 57 STAN. L. REV. 1557 (2005).
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adopted binding employment arbitration. 57 Stewart Schwab and Ran-
dall Thomas's study of CEO contracts in large public firms found that
41.6% had arbitration clauses. 58
Other studies have examined the incidence of arbitration clauses in
franchise agreements. An informal review of franchise contracts by
Christopher Drahozal found that about half of Minnesota franchise
agreements provided for arbitration. 59 He found that the agreements
that did provide for arbitration typically involved major national fran-
chisers such as McDonalds. He seemed surprised that the incidence
of arbitration agreements was so low.6° Drahozal, in a study co-au-
thored by Keith Hylton, found a statistically significant, negative cor-
relation between the percentage of company-owned units in a
franchise network and the probability of an arbitration clause appear-
ing in the franchise contract.61 Both of these results suggest that arbi-
tration clauses will appear in most of the contracts studied here.
In areas other than employment and franchising, studies find low
rates of arbitration clause presence. Florencia Marotta-Wurgler's re-
cent study of 597 end-user software license agreements found low
rates (about 6%) of arbitration clauses.62 And Elizabeth Rolph, Erik
Moller, and John Rolph found that only 9% of a sample of California
physicians and hospitals used arbitration agreements. 63
With respect to international contracts, there are estimates that as
many as 90% have binding arbitration provisions. 64 Drahozal and
Richard Naimark report that, from 1993 to 1996, 15 of 17 (88.2%)
international joint venture agreements in the SEC EDGAR database
included an arbitration clause.65 Alessandra Casella reports that offi-
cials of the Netherlands Arbitration Institute indicate that more than
80% of private international contracts have arbitration clauses.66 But
57. See Colvin, supra note 7, at 586-87 & tbl.l.
58. Stewart J. Schwab & Randall S. Thomas, An Empirical Analysis of CEO Employment
Contracts: What Do Top Executives Bargain for?, 63 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 231, 234 (2006).
59. Drahozal, supra note 37.
60. Id.
61. Christopher R. Drahozal & Keith N. Hylton, The Economics of Litigation and Arbitration:
An Application to Franchise Contracts, 32 J. LEGAL STUD. 549, 575 (2003).
62. Marotta-Wurgler, supra note 50.
63. Rolph, Moller & Rolph, supra note 49, at 171.
64. KLAUS PETER BERGER, 9 TRANSNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW 8 n.62 (1993) (citing A.J. VAN
DEN BERG ET AL., ARBITRAGERECHT 134 (1988)).
65. Commentary to Stephen R. Bond, How to Draft an Arbitration Clause (Revisited), in To-
WARDS A SCIENCE OF INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION, supra note 53, at 57, 59.
66. Alessandra Casella, On Market Integration and the Development of Institutions: The Case
of International Commercial Arbitration, 40 EUR. ECON. REV. 155, 156-57 (1996). But cf Bar-
bara Koremenos, If Only Half of International Agreements Have Dispute Resolution Provisions,
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it is recognized that systematic knowledge of international arbitration
is thin.67
III. THE DATA SET
The data consist of thirteen categories of contracts contained as ex-
hibits to Form 8-K, "current report" filings with the SEC. A form 8-K
must be filed by SEC-reporting firms to disclose certain material cor-
porate events that have not previously been reported by the company.
We searched the Form 8-K filings and coded information about any
contract that fit into Table l's categories. The resulting sample con-
sisted of 2858 contracts.
The types of contracts studied are listed in Table 1. Each of the
contract types in Table 1 was reported to be, or to be related to, a
material corporate event. For twelve contract categories, six months
of contracts were studied, covering the period from January 1, 2002 to
June 30, 2002. For merger contracts, the study covered a seven-month
period from January 1, 2002 to July 31, 2002. The slightly expanded
period for merger contracts exploits our earlier detailed work on
choice of law and choice of forum in merger contracts.68 Most of the
contract types are self-explanatory. Pooling and servicing contracts
are used in mortgage pass-through and other asset-backed securities
arrangements; they represent agreements under which an owner
transfers receivables to a trustee who holds title to, and collects the
income from, the assets and passes the funds through to investors.69
Trust agreements establish these trusts and define various powers and
responsibilities. 70
Securities purchase agreements were the most frequent contract
type and accounted for 16.1% of the total contracts. Credit-related
contracts-bond indentures, credit commitments, pooling and servic-
ing agreements, and security agreements-accounted for another
20.3% of the contracts. Merger contracts were about 14% of the sam-
Which Half Needs Explaining?, 36 J. LEGAL STUD. 189 (2007) (reporting a study in which about
half of public international agreements have dispute resolution clauses).
67. Introduction: Empirical Perspectives on International Commercial Arbitration, to To-
WARDS A SCIENCE OF INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION, supra note 53, at 3, 3 ("[M]uch of what we
do know about international arbitration is based on anecdote ... rather than careful empirical
study.").
68. Theodore Eisenberg & Geoffrey Miller, Ex Ante Choices of Law and Forum: An Empiri-
cal Analysis of Corporate Merger Agreements, 59 VAND. L. REV. 1975 (2006).
69. See, e.g., Circuit City Credit Card Master Trust, Current Report (Form 8-K), exhibit 4.2
(Jan. 31, 2002). See generally Thomas E. Plank, The Security of Securitization and the Future of
Security. 25 CARDOZO L. REV. 1655 (2004).
70. See, e.g., First Consumers Nat'l Bank, Current Report (Form 8-K), exhibit 4.3 (Jan. 31,
2002).
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TABLE 1. TYPES OF CONTRACTS STUDIED
(NUMBER OF CONTRACTS IN PARENTHESES)
Asset sale/purchase (314) Pooling and servicing (173)
Bond indentures (155) Securities purchase (460)
Credit commitments (216) Security agreements (37)
Employment (111) Settlements (72)
Licensing (48) Trust agreements (48)
Mergers (411) Underwriting (351)
Other (362)
Source: SEC EDGAR database, LEXIS EDGAR PLUS database, Jan. 1, 2002 to June 30, 2002
for all contract types other than mergers and Jan. 1, 2002 to July 31, 2002 for merger contracts.
pie, although they did have one extra month of coverage in the data.
Together, the contract types offer a rich variety of relations. Several
types, including the credit-related contracts, obviously involve sub-
stantial financial institutions. Asset sale/purchase and merger con-
tracts involve corporate restructurings. Settlements involved the
resolution of disputes. Employment contracts offer insights into dis-
pute resolution contract terms in agreements between key employees
and large corporate employers.
As noted in our previous study of choice of law and forum in
merger contracts, the contracts in our sample are attractive objects of
study.71 Because the contracts are material events in the lives of pub-
licly traded corporations, the contracts are a reasonable sample of
what sophisticated parties specify ex ante regarding arbitration. The
importance of the contracts to corporate operations suggests that the
contracts receive care and attention when they are negotiated and
drafted. Moreover, because the contracts are written before disputes
arise, we can be reasonably confident that in most cases the con-
tracting parties did not anticipate the precise nature of the disputes
that might arise, and therefore would not know whether a particular
term would help or hurt them in the event of a conflict. These charac-
teristics support our hypothesis that the contract terms we observe
represent what the parties regard as reasonably efficient, ex ante allo-
cations of rights and duties.
IV. EMPIRICAL RESULTS
We analyzed each contract to determine whether it contained a
binding arbitration clause. We report results.for the basic frequency
of arbitration clauses by contract type as well as results subdivided by
71. Eisenberg & Miller, supra note 68, at 7.
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whether there was a non-U.S. party to the contract. Although the
type of contract involved is the strongest indicator of whether or not
the contract contains an arbitration clause, we also explore the follow-
ing secondary influences: the degree of standardization for the type of
contract and the contractual category's relational status, choice of law,
place of incorporation, place of business, and attorney locale.
A. Arbitration Clauses
Table 2 reports the number and percentage of contracts that contain
arbitration clauses. The overwhelming majority, about 89%, do not
mandate arbitration.72 Whatever arbitration's supposed efficiencies,
sophisticated actors are not flocking to it in a broad range of impor-
tant contracts. Some contract types-pooling and servicing agree-
ments and trust agreements-never provided for arbitration.
Others-bond indentures, underwriting agreements, and security
agreements-almost never did. But material variation exists across
contract types. For example, 37% of employment contracts and 33%
of licensing agreements provided for arbitration. Clearly, the nature
of the contract is associated with whether the parties agree ex ante to
arbitrate.
The results support the view, expressed by corporate lawyers, that
the decision to include an arbitration provision in a commercial con-
tract is complex and cannot be determined across the board. The in-
frequency of arbitration clauses across the entire range of categories
also suggests that sophisticated contracting parties may not, in fact,
believe in the purported benefits of arbitration over litigation.
B. Arbitration Clauses in International Contracts
Table 3 reports the frequency of arbitration clauses in contracts in-
volving a non-U.S. party. Consistent with our hypothesis, arbitration
clauses appear more frequently in international contracts than in do-
mestic ones. Clauses appear at about twice the domestic rate when
the contract includes a non-U.S. party, and the result is highly statisti-
cally significant (p < 0.001). More surprisingly, however, the interna-
tional contracts, like the domestic contracts, contain a low absolute
rate of arbitration clauses: only about 20% of international contracts
72. Some observers have noted that arbitration is not the preferred form of dispute resolution
among corporate lawyers, despite its purported benefits. See Rebecca Callahan, Arbitration v.
Litigation: The Right to Appeal and Other Misperceptions Fueling the Preference for a Judicial
Forum (ExpressO Preprint Series, Working Paper No. 1248, 2006), available at http://Iaw.
bepress.com/expresso/eps/1248 (discussing a survey of 400 business lawyers in southern
California).
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TABLE 2. SUMMARY OF ARBITRATION CLAUSE
PRESENCE BY CONTRACT TYPE
Contract type No arbitration Arbitration Total
clause clause
Mergers (N) 333 78 411
Percent (%) 81.02 18.98
Bond indentures (N) 154 1 155
Percent (%) 99.35 0.65
Settlements (N) 60 12 72
Percent (%) 83.33 16.67
Securities purchase (N) 406 54 460
Percent (%) 88.26 11.74
Employment contracts (N) 70 41 111
Percent (%) 63.06 36.94
Licensing (N) 32 16 48
Percent (%) 66.67 33.33
Asset sale purchase (N) 253 61 314
Percent (%) 80.57 19.43
Credit commitments (N) 211 5 216
Percent (%) 97.69 2.31
Underwriting (N) 350 1 351
Percent (%) 99.72 0.28
Pooling & servicing (N) 173 0 173
Percent (%) 100 0
Security agreements (N) 35 2 37
Percent (%) 94.59 5.41
Trust agreements (N) 48 0 48
Percent (%) 100 0
Other (N) 429 33 462
Percent (%) 92.86 7.14
Total (N) 2554 304 2858
Percent (%) 89.36 10.64
Source: SEC EDGAR database, LEXIS EDGAR PLUS database, Jan. 1, 2002 to June 30, 2002
for all contract types other than mergers and Jan. 1, 2002 to July 31, 2002 for merger contracts.
TABLE 3. ARBITRATION CLAUSE PRESENCE BY PARTY STATUS
No arbitration Arbitration Total
clause clause
U.S. parties only (N) 2334 249 2583
Percent (%) 90.36 9.64
Non-U.S. party (N) 217 55 272
Percent (%) 79.78 20.22
Total (N) 2551 304 2855
Percent (%) 89.35 10.65
Source: SEC EDGAR database, LEXIS EDGAR PLUS database, Jan. 1, 2002 to June 30, 2002
for all contract types other than mergers and Jan. 1, 2002 to July 31, 2002 for merger contracts.
Contracts in which either party is a non-U.S. entry are coded as Non-U.S. party contracts.
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contain them. This finding contrasts with predictions that arbitration
is the dispute resolution mechanism in international contractual set-
tings, and that the vast majority of international contracts provide for
binding arbitration.'
Table 4 breaks down the results in Table 3 by contract type. The
first row reported for each contract type shows the proportion of con-
tracts containing an arbitration clause, subdivided by domestic (first
numerical column) and international (second numerical column) con-
tracts. For example, the first row in Table 4 shows that 19.0% of the
domestic merger contracts and 18.6% of the international merger con-
tracts had arbitration clauses. The second row for each contract type
shows the number of contracts in the sample. For example, the sec-
ond row in Table 4 shows that there were 368 domestic merger agree-
ments and 43 international merger agreements.
Although the rate of arbitration clauses in merger contracts does
not vary by domestic/international status, it does significantly or
nearly significantly vary for other contract types. Securities purchase
contracts (p = 0.078), licensing contracts (p = 0.027), assets sale or
purchase contracts (p = 0.067), and underwriting contracts (p = 0.040)
show statistically significantly (p < 0.05) or nearly statistically signifi-
cantly (p < 0.10) increased rates of arbitration clauses in international
contracts compared to domestic contracts. Perhaps the most striking
figure in Table 4 is that 63.6% of the international licensing contracts
mandate arbitration-the only figure that conforms to the received
wisdom about the frequency of arbitration clauses in international
contracts. However, the relatively small number of contracts on
which the figure is based (7 of 11) suggests that caution is warranted in
reaching conclusions based solely on these data.
C. Secondary Sources of Variation in Rates of Arbitration Clauses
The varying frequency of arbitration clauses suggests the possible
utility of more detailed modeling of whether a contract contains an
arbitration clause. This Section explores five possible influences on
the presence of arbitration clauses: the degree of standardization in
the type of contract being considered, the contract type's relational
status, the choice of law in the contract, the place of business of a
party to the contract, and the locale of the attorneys who appear in
the Form 8-K report that contains the contract. We first explore each
influence separately and then combine them in regression models.
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TABLE 4. ARBITRATION CLAUSE PRESENCE BY PARTY
STATUS AND CONTRACT TYPE
Contract type No non-U.S. Non-U.S. Total
party party
Mergers
Bond indentures
Settlements
Securities purchase
Employment contracts
Licensing
Asset sale purchase
Credit commitments
Underwriting
Pooling & servicing
Security agreements
Trust agreements
Other
0.190
368
0.007
151
0.15
60
0.105
382
0.377
106
0.243
37
0.175
268
0.020
196
0
337
0
170
0.056
36
0
48
0.064
424
0.186
43
0
4
0.25
12
0.182
77
0.2
5
0.636
11
0.304
46
0.050
20
0.071
14
0
3
0
1
0
0.167
36
0.190
411
0.006
155
0.167
72
0.118*
459
0.369
111
0.333**
48
0.194*
314
0.023
216
0.003**
351
0
173
0.054
37
0
48
0.072**
460
Total 0.096 0.202 0.106
2583 272 2855
Source: SEC EDGAR database, LEXIS EDGAR PLUS database, Jan. 1, 2002 to June 30, 2002
for all contract types other than mergers and Jan. 1, 2002 to July 31, 2002 for merger contracts.
Contracts in which either party is a non-U.S. entry are coded as Non-U.S. party contracts. The
first row for each contract type shows the proportion of contracts containing arbitration clauses.
The second row shows the number of contracts used to compute the proportion. The * indicates
domestic/international arbitration clause rate difference is significant at p < 0.10; the ** indicates
p < 0.05. P-values are based on Fisher's exact test.
1. Standardization and Industry Practice
As shown in Table 2, the rate of arbitration clauses varies substan-
tially depending on the type of contract. One possible reason for this
variation is the degree of standardization. Highly standardized con-
tracts may be perceived as having a low risk of litigation. Standard
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terms create a common understanding that can reduce the disputes
over contractual meaning that tend to spark litigation. Arbitration
clauses may not be regarded as being necessary or worth sacrificing
the perceived benefits of litigation.73 On the other hand, where con-
tracts are highly standardized-as in the case of pooling and servicing
or trust agreements-it might be the case that arbitration could add
value because expert arbitrators selected by the parties might be able
to give a better informed meaning to the highly specialized terms con-
tained in these agreements, or because arbitration eliminates the risk
of a judicial interpretation that could function as precedent or even be
the basis for collateral estoppel in later cases.
The degree of contract standardization is not a commonly defined
metric. We constructed an objective measure of standardization by
examining the distribution of choice of law patterns for each contract
type. A class of contract that regularly designates a particular choice
of law has likely achieved a degree of standardization beyond that of a
class of contract that designates many different choices of law. It is, of
course, possible for contracts to be completely standardized in all
other terms and vary only in their choice of law. But this is not likely
to be the general tendency. Furthermore, as shown below, the results
of categorizing according to our standardization measure appear plau-
sible. Highly regularized financial transactions such as pooling and
service agreements and trust agreements score high in standardiza-
tion. Less regularized contracts, such as settlements and licensing
agreements, score low by our standardization measure.
In measuring the concentration of choice of law provisions, it is
helpful to note that approximately 70% of the contracts designate
New York (47%), Delaware (14%), or California (7%) law as the gov-
erning law. The choice of law for other contracts is widely dispersed
across many locales and these contracts can be excluded without sacri-
ficing a reasonable measure of concentration. No other locale ac-
counts for even 4% of choice of law provisions. We use the degree of
concentration among the three leading states to classify contracts as
having high, medium, or low rates of standardization.
Figure 1 shows, for each of twelve contract categories (the contract
category Other is excluded from this analysis), the distribution of
choice of law among New York, Delaware, and California. It shows
73. At least one commentary has suggested, in the context of insurance policies, that arbitra-
tion clauses are more likely to be seen in nonstandardized contracts. Abraham & Montgomery,
supra note 43, at 358 ("Few standard-form primary commercial liability and property insurance
policies issued by American insurers contain arbitration clauses. Certain non-standard insurance
policies, in contrast, do contain mandatory arbitration clauses.").
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that bond indentures, credit commitments, underwriting contracts,
pooling and service agreements, security agreements, and trust agree-
ments all have high choice of law concentrations. For example, nearly
all bond indentures and underwriting contracts designate New York
law as the governing law. Trust agreements most frequently select
Delaware law as the choice of law. The others most frequently select
New York law. We treat mergers, securities purchase agreements, and
asset sale purchase agreements as having medium concentrations.
Each has a concentration (or density 74) of over 0.5 in one state accord-
ing to the histograms, but these three contract types are not nearly as
concentrated as the highly concentrated group. Settlements, employ-
ment contracts, and licensing agreements have low choice of law con-
centrations. None has a density of 0.5 in the histograms.
Choice of law concentration is strongly associated with the presence
of an arbitration clause. Almost no contracts with high choice of law
concentrations have arbitration clauses (0.9%). In contrast, 16.3% of
contracts with medium choice of law concentrations have arbitration
clauses, and 29.9% with low choice of law concentrations have arbitra-
tion clauses. Our standardization index clearly conveys some infor-
mation about the relationship between the type of contract and the
inclusion of an arbitration clause.
The standardization measure has an advantage over individualized
contract types as an explanatory variable in modeling the presence of
an arbitration clause. The standardized measure does not require ex-
cluding contract types that are so standardized that they exhibit no
choice of law variation. Table 2 shows that pooling and service con-
tracts and trust agreements never contain arbitration clauses. This
lack of variation precludes modeling the decision to have an arbitra-
tion clause by using a dummy variable for these contract types.
We hypothesized that arbitration clause rates would vary by indus-
try.7 5 A reporting company's SEC filing includes its Standard Indus-
try Classification (SIC). 7 6 The SIC system yields many industry
categories that contain too few firms to allow for reasonable statistical
74. The height of a bar in a relative frequency histogram represents the density of data points
in the histogram cell that the bar is drawn over. If a cell centered at x has width w and contains k
data points, the height of the bar is h(x) = (k/n) x (11w), which is directly proportional to the
density of points in the interval, where density = kw.
75. This hypothesis was suggested by Florencia Marotta-Wurgler in comments to an earlier
draft.
76. See U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, CF SIC Code List, http://www.sec.gov/
info/edgar/siccodes.htm (last visited Feb. 2, 2007).
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FIGURE 1. DISTRIBUTION OF CHOICE OF LAW BY CONTRACT TYPE
mergers bond indentues setlements surities purchase
.5
0
underwriting
DE NY CA DE NY CA DE
Law chosen
NY CA
Source: SEC EDGAR database, LEXIS EDGAR PLUS database, Jan. 1, 2002 to June 30, 2002
for all contract types other than mergers and Jan. 1, 2002 to July 31, 2002 for merger contracts.
Each histogram shows the distribution of contracts by choice of law. Contracts designating Del-
aware, New York, or California law are included. All other contracts are coded as designating
an Other choice of law and not used in the standardization computation.
analysis. We therefore regroup the SIC categories into seventeen rea-
sonably sized classifications. 77
Table 5 reports the rate of arbitration clause use by these classifica-
tions. The incidence of arbitration clauses varies substantially by in-
dustry; the table as a whole yields a statistically significant difference
(p < 0.001). The "Finance, insurance, real estate" grouping is the larg-
est and has an extremely low rate of arbitration clauses (about 4.7%).
The highest rate of arbitration clause use is in the "Industrial machin-
ery and equipment" grouping (25%).
77. We started with the twenty-five industry groups used by the U.S. General Accounting
Office, see U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, PUBLIC ACCOUNTING FIRMS: MANDATED STUDY
ON CONSOLIDATION AND COMPETITION app. iv, tbl.12 at 111 (2003), available at http://
www.gao.gov/new.items/d03864.pdf. These were then reduced to seventeen industry groups, see
Theodore Eisenberg & Jonathan R. Macey, Was Arthur Andersen Different? An Empirical Ex-
amination of Major Accounting Firm Audits of Large Clients, 1 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 263
(2004).
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TABLE 5. ARBITRATION CLAUSE STATUS BY INDUSTRY
SIC-based groups No arbitration Arbitration Total
clause clause
Mineral industries (N)
Percent (%)
Construction industries (N)
Percent (%)
Manufacturing (N)
Percent (%)
Transportation and utilities (N)
Percent (%)
Communications (N)
Percent (%)
Wholesale trade (N)
Percent (%)
Retail trade (N)
Percent (%)
Finance, insurance, real estate (N)
Percent (%)
Services (N)
Percent (%)
Instruments and related products (N)
Percent (%)
Food and kindred products (N)
Percent (%)
Paper and allied products (N)
Percent (%)
Chemicals and allied products (N)
Percent (%)
Industrial machinery and equipment (N)
Percent (%)
Electrical and electronic equipment (N)
Percent (%)
Transportation equipment (N)
Percent (%)
No SIC listed or SIC missing (N)
Percent (%)
101
Total (N) 2554 304 2858
Percent (%) 89.36 10.64
Source: SEC EDGAR database, LEXIS EDGAR PLUS database, Jan. 1, 2002 to June 30, 2002
for all contract types other than mergers and Jan. 1, 2002 to July 31, 2002 for merger contracts.
2. Relational Contracts
We found little evidence that relational contracts, as best we could
code for that characteristic, are more associated with the inclusion of
arbitration clauses. The six contract types that we estimated to be
more relational than others-credit commitments, employment, li-
censing, pooling and servicing agreements, security agreements, and
89
88.12
22
84.62
141
89.24
104
96.30
98
91.59
77
90.59
87
89.69
755
95.33
469
84.50
57
83.82
33
97.06
19
90.48
130
83.33
75
75.00
112
86.82
25
86.21
261
89.38
12
11.88
4
15.38
17
10.76
4
3.70
9
8.41
8
9.41
10
10.31
37
4.67
86
15.50
11
16.18
1
2.94
2
9.52
26
16.67
25
25.00
17
13.18
4
13.79
31
10.62
DEPAUL LAW REVIEW
trust agreements-had arbitration clauses in 64 of 633 (10.1%) con-
tracts. The five contract types that we estimated to have been less
relational than other contract types-asset sales, bond indentures,
mergers, securities purchase agreements, and underwritings-had ar-
bitration clauses in 195 of 1691 (11.5%) contracts. The direction of
the effect is the opposite of what we expected but the result is not
close to being statistically significant (p = 0.332). Results do not
change materially if we characterize trust agreements as ambiguous
and include them in neither the relational nor nonrelational catego-
ries. The relational category had a 10.9% arbitration clause rate and
the nonrelational category an 11.5% rate, an insignificant association
(p = 0.698). We did not include a variable for relational contracts in
our subsequent analyses.
3. Choice of Law
Independent of its association with standardization, choice of law
information may help explain the pattern of arbitration clauses. State
law treatment of arbitration provisions could influence parties' deci-
sions to include arbitration clauses. The state law chosen, as distinct
from the bare concentration of choice of law, may reflect underlying
views about the respective desirability of arbitration and litigation. If
the parties believe a particular state's law is highly efficient, that might
be viewed as reducing the costs of litigation and providing a reason
not to include an arbitration clause. 78 Because choice of law is con-
centrated in three states, we report the rates of arbitration clauses for
four choices of law: Delaware, New York, California, and Other.79
Table 6 shows, for each contract type and choice of law locale, the
proportion of contracts containing arbitration clauses. For mergers,
settlements, employment contracts, licensing agreements, and credit
commitments, California law is associated with a higher proportion of
arbitration clauses than New York or Delaware. California has a
higher rate of arbitration clauses in five of the seven contract types in
which California is designated more than three times as the choice of
law. Overall, about 24% of contracts that chose California law con-
tain arbitration clauses, compared to 12% of contracts that chose Del-
78. Similar considerations might support using choice of forum information instead of, or in
addition to, choice of law. But many fewer contracts specify choice of forum than choice of law.
At least 1700 contracts did not specify a choice of forum whereas nearly all specify a choice of
law. See Eisenberg & Miller, supra note 68.
79. For contracts that designate more than one state's law (for example, New York law gov-
erns except where Delaware law applies), we used the first-mentioned state.
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aware law, 4% of contracts that chose New York law, and about 16%
of contracts that chose Other law.
TABLE 6. ARBITRATION CLAUSE PRESENCE BY
CHOICE OF LAW AND CONTRACT TYPE
Contract type DE NY CA Other
Mergers 0.120 0.174 0.373 0.212
133 69 51 66
Bond indentures 0.000 0.007 0.000 0.000
1 138 4 12
Settlements 0.167 0.231 0.273 0.111
12 13 11 36
Securities purchase 0.167 0.053 0.152 0.162
78 188 46 148
Employment contracts 0.333 0.333 0.357 0.380
6 12 14 79
Licensing 0.200 0.300 0.500 0.320
5 10 8 25
Asset sale purchase 0.313 0.134 0.233 0.194
32 82 30 170
Credit commitments 0.000 0.000 0.111 0.042
6 105 9 96
Underwriting 0.003 0.000 0.000
327 1 23
Pooling service 0.000 0.000 0.000
17 149 7
Security agreements 0.000 0.000 0.167
22 3 12
Trust agreements 0.000 0.000 0.000
39 7 2
Other 0.068 0.038 0.143 0.095
88 185 42 147
Total 0.120 0.040 0.237 0.162
417 1307 219 823
Source: SEC EDGAR database, LEXIS EDGAR PLUS database, Jan. 1, 2002 to June 30, 2002
for all contract types other than mergers and Jan. 1, 2002 to July 31, 2002 for merger contracts.
The first row for each contract type shows the proportion of contracts of that type containing an
arbitration clause. The columns break down the results by choice of law locale. The second row
for each contract type shows the total number of contracts of that type with or without
arbitration clauses. All contracts not designating Delaware, New York, or California law are
coded as "Other."
Table 6's breakdown by contract type shows that the relative promi-
nence of arbitration clauses in California is not solely a consequence
of different contract types being associated with different state laws.
Regression analysis confirms this in a model that simultaneously con-
2007]
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trols for contract type and choice of law. 80 California contracts also
contain arbitration clauses at significantly higher rates than New York
contracts.
4. Place of Business
In addition to choice of law and contract type, one might expect a
business's location to influence, the decision to include an arbitration
clause. Business location is associated with where events affecting a
business might occur. Thus, the location of events influences choice of
law and forum. Place of business is often associated with choice of
law, 81 but they are not always the same.
Designating a single place of business for each contract requires
considering the nature of the contract. For some contracts, such as
merger contracts, two places of business are plausible: that of the ac-
quiring company and that of the acquired company. For such con-
tracts, we used what one would normally expect to be the dominant
place of business. For example, for merger contracts, we used the ac-
quiring company's place of business. Table 7 shows the business lo-
cale chosen for twelve types of contracts. Because of the varied
nature of the Other category, we excluded such contracts from this
analysis.
Table 8 reports, for each contract type and place of business, the
proportion of contracts with arbitration clauses. To keep the output
manageable, we report results only for states that were the place of
business in at least fifty contracts. States with fewer contracts are in-
cluded in the residual category.
Table 8 confirms the Table 6 findings that arbitration clauses appear
at a greater rate in contracts with California ties. Table 8 shows for
place of business what Table 6 shows for choice of law. For every type
of contract with more than a handful of arbitration clauses, Califor-
nia's arbitration clause rate (first numerical column) exceeded the ar-
bitration clause rate for all places of business combined (last
numerical column). For example, 23.7% of California merger con-
tracts had arbitration clauses, compared to 19% for all states com-
bined. Table 8's Total row shows that only Pennsylvania had a higher
80. In a logistic regression model with arbitration clause as the dependent variable and
dummy variables for contract type, law chosen, and non-U.S. party as the explanatory variables,
the coefficient on California law being chosen is statistically significant (p = 0.035). Delaware
law served as the reference category. But the lack of variation in the presence of arbitration
clauses for pooling and service agreements and trust agreements precludes including them in the
model. California's difference from Other was significant (p = 0.018). California's difference
from New York was also significant (p < 0.0001).
81. See generally Eisenberg & Miller, supra note 68.
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TABLE 7. PLACE OF BUSINESS BY CONTRACT TYPE
Contract type Place of business
Mergers Acquiring company's place of business
Bond indentures Issuer's place of business
Settlements Reporting company's place of business
Securities purchase Issuer's place of business
Employment contracts Employer's place of business
Licensing Licensor's place of business
Asset sale purchase Buyer's place of notice location
Credit commitments Principal lender's designated office
Underwriting Issuer's place of business
Pooling service Depositor's place of business
Security agreements Registrant's place of business
Trust agreements Registrant's place of business
Source: SEC EDGAR database, LEXIS EDGAR PLUS database, Jan. 1, 2002 to June 30, 2002
for all contract types other than mergers and Jan. 1, 2002 to July 31, 2002 for merger contracts.
Excludes contracts categorized as Other.
rate of contracts with arbitration clauses, 21.1%, than California's
15.7%. But Pennsylvania had only about 20% as many business loca-
tions as California.
We recognize, of course, that choice of law locales and business lo-
cales are not independent of one another. The central result is that
using either locale shows that California has relatively high arbitration
clause rates.
5. Attorney's Place of Business
An attorney's location could influence whether an arbitration
clause is used if local practice or custom dictates whether to include an
arbitration clause. Attorney locale is likely associated with choice of
law and place of business.82 Nevertheless, there may be an attorney
effect with arbitration clauses in addition to choice of law and place of
business effects. For example, in merger contracts, New York attor-
neys are more likely than other attorneys to specify a litigation fo-
rum.83  Information about attorney locale is sketchier than
information about choice of law or place of business. Attorney locale
is available only for law firms mentioned in the Form 8-K, so we are
limited to using those law firms appearing in the form with useable
addresses. And we could not always link an attorney mentioned with
a principal party to the contract.
82. See generally id.
83. See generally id.
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Table 9 reports the rate of arbitration clauses for each of twelve
contract types (excluding_ Other), broken down by attorney locale.
Attorney locale is more widely dispersed than choice of law. As
shown above, Delaware, New York, and California account for almost
70% of the choices of law, but they account for less than 50% of the
attorney locales. Even taking into account the greater likelihood of
missing data for attorney locale (note the high number of locales
coded as Other in Table 9), New York and California are the leading
attorney locales, but they represent only a small portion of the con-
tracts. Table 9's last row indicates that New York can be identified as
an attorney locale in 269 of 2396 contracts; California can be identi-
fied as an attorney locale in 182 of 2396 contracts. Interestingly, Dela-
ware was the attorney locale in less than 50 contracts. The large
Other category makes us reluctant to conclude whether attorney lo-
cale is more or less concentrated than business locale.
Despite the sketchiness of the attorney data, they tend to confirm a
key Table 8 finding about the relationship between locale and the use
of arbitration clauses. For every type of contract with more than a few
arbitration clauses, California's arbitration clause rate (first numerical
column) exceeded the arbitration clause rate for all attorney locales
combined (last numerical column). For example, 24.3% of California
merger contracts had arbitration clauses compared to 19% for all
states combined. Table 9 shows that only Massachusetts had a higher
rate of contracts with arbitration clauses, 18.2%, than California's
18.1%. But Massachusetts had only about 30% as many attorney lo-
cales as California. As in Table 8, Pennsylvania had a relatively high
rate of arbitration clauses.
6. Regression Results
The previous subsections separately assess the relationship between
arbitration clause presence in a contract and (1) presence of a non-
U.S. party to the contract, (2) degree of contract standardization and
industry, (3) choice of law, (4) place of business, and (5) attorney lo-
cale. This subsection models arbitration clause presence as a simulta-
neous function of these characteristics.
Each model in Table 10 is a logistic regression model in which the
dependent variable equals one if an arbitration clause is in the con-
tract and otherwise equals zero. Model (1) contains a dummy variable
for a non-U.S. entity being a party to the contract and dummy vari-
ables for the degree of standardization as discussed above with respect
to Figure 1. A low degree of standardization is the reference category.
Model (2) adds dummy variables for choice of law, with Delaware as
20071
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TABLE 9. ARBITRATION CLAUSE PRESENCE BY ATTORNEY
LOCALE AND CONTRACT TYPE
Contract type CA IL MA NY PA TX Other Total
Mergers 0.243 0.056 0.118 0.090 0.188 0.133 0.225 0.190
74 18 17 67 16 15 204 411
Bond indentures 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.008 0.006
4 2 1 13 1 7 127 155
Settlements 0.400 1.000' 0.000 0.000 0.158 0.167
5 1 6 3 57 72
Securities purchase 0.104 0.200 0.200 0.117 0.143 0.118 0.112 0.117
48 10 15 60 7 17 303 460
Employment contracts 0.000 0.667 0.143 0.429 1.000 0.363 0.369
1 3 7 7 2 91 111
Licensing 1.000 0.667 0.000 0.302 0.333
1 3 1 43 48
Asset sale purchase 0.292 0.000 0.429 0.133 0.400 0.182 0.192 0.194
24 9 7 45 5 11 213 314
Credit commitments 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.028 0.023
5 4 4 14 3 10 176 216
Underwriting 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.004 0.003
14 5 7 51 8 26 240 351
Pooling service 0.000 0.000
173 173
Security agreements 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.080 0.054
7 1 1 3 25 37
Trust agreements 0.000 0.000
48 48
Total 0.181 0.078 0.182 0.082 0.180 0.090 0.109 0.113
182 51 55 269 50 89 1700 2396
Source: SEC EDGAR database, LEXIS EDGAR PLUS database, Jan. 1, 2002 to June 30, 2002
for all contract types other than mergers and Jan. 1, 2002 to July 31, 2002 for merger contracts.
The first row for each contract type shows the proportion of contracts of that type containing an
arbitration clause. The columns break down the results by attorney locale. The second row for
each contract type shows the total number of contracts of that type with or without arbitration
clauses. All locales that are attorney locales in fewer than fifty contracts, and unknown locales,
are designated Other.
the reference category. Model (3) adds, but does not report, dummy
variables for SIC codes as reported in Table 5. Model (4) adds, but
does not report, dummy variables for place of business as described in
Table 8. Model (5) adds, but does not report, dummy variables for
attorney locale as described in Table 9. Model (6) uses dummy vari-
ables for each contract type in lieu of the standardization dummy vari-
ables and includes dummy variables for SIC codes.
All models confirm the bivariate analysis results. Contracts without
a U.S. party have a higher incidence of arbitration clauses. Contracts
with medium standardization are less likely to have arbitration clauses
than contracts with low standardization. Contracts with high stand-
ardization tend not to have arbitration clauses compared to contracts
with medium or low standardization. Contracts with medium stand-
364
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TABLE 10. LOGISTIC REGRESSION MODELS OF
PRESENCE OF AN ARBITRATION CLAUSE
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Dependent variable = 1 if contract has an arbitration Model (3)
clause marginal effects
Non-U.S. party 0.497** 0.535** 0.562** 0.575** 0.583** 0.655** 0.031*
(2.69) (2.75) (2.85) (2,84) (2.88) (3.31) (2.24)
Medium standardization -0.809** -0.695** 0728** -0741** -0.760** -0.032**
(4.91) (3.98) (4.10) (4.11) (4.11) (3.63)
High standardization -3.790** -3.315** -3.217** -3.170** -3205** -0.157
(10.36) (8.31) (7.96) (7.82) (7.87) (8.82)
New York law -0.583* -0.539* -0.635** -0.608* -0.473+ -0.024*
(2.49) (2.26) (2.63) (2.50) (1.85) (2.14)
California law 0.578* 0.608* 0.541+ 0.529+ 0.586* 0.034+
(2.36) (2.44) (1.90) (1.84) (2.30) (1.88)
Other law 0.187 0.191 0.241 0.235 0.116 0.009
(0.93) (0.93) (1.14) (1.10) (0.51) (0.89)
Bond indentures -3.001**
(2.88)
Settlements -0.233
(0.63)
Securities purchase -0.521*
(2.30)
Employment contracts 0.902**
(3.23)
Licensing 0.632+
(1.73)
Asset sale purchase -0.048
(0.21)
Credit commitments -2.216**
(4.58)
Underwriting -3.807**
(3.67)
Security agreements -1.194
(1.51)
Constant -0.919** -1.055"* -0.496 -0.278 -0.241 -0.981*
(6.27) (4.73) (1.15) (0.56) (0.46) (2.49)
Observations 2395 2303 2303 2303 2303 2082 2303
SIC code dummies No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Place of business
dummies No No No Yes Yes No No
Attorney locale
dummies No No No No Yes No No
Source: SEC EDGAR database, LEXIS EDGAR PLUS database, Jan. 1, 2002 to June 30, 2002
for all contract types other than mergers and Jan. 1, 2002 to July 31, 2002 for merger contracts.
Absolute values of robust t, z statistics in parentheses. + significant at 10%; * significant at 5%;
** significant at 1%. Reference categories are low standardization, Delaware as the choice of
law, and mergers as the contract type in model (6). Model (6) omits pooling service and trust
agreements because they do not vary-all lack arbitration clauses. Models (3) through (6)
include, but we do not report, dummy variables for SIC codes as reported in Table 5. Models (4)
and (5) include, but we do not report, dummy variables for place of business as reported in Table
8. Model (5) includes, but we do not report, dummy variables for attorney locale as reported in
Table 9. Column (7) reports the change in probability of observing an arbitration clause based
on the presence of a variable, while constraining the other variables to their mean values.
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ardization tend'not to have arbitration clauses compared to contracts
with low standardization. 84
Contracts with California ties'tend to include arbitration clauses
more than contracts without California ties. Contracts with' New York
ties tend to exclude arbitration clauses compared to contracts lacking
New York ties. These results are statistically significant or nearly. so
for all variables in all models. The marginal significance of the Cali-
fornia law dummy variable in models (4) and (5) may be due to the
multicollinearity of that variable with the California business and at-
torney locale dummy variables included in the models.
Note that model (6) has fewer observations than the other models.
This is because pooling and service agreements and trust agreements
drop out of the model due to a lack of variation; they never contain
arbitration clauses. The model nevertheless confirms the non-U.S.
party and state choice of law results that emerge in the other models.
The coefficients on the contract-type dummy variables in model (6)
are also consistent with the results suggested by using the standardiza-
tion dummy variables in models (1) to (5). For example, the highly
standardized bond indenture, credit commitment, and underwriting
contracts are all negatively, and significantly, associated with the pres-
ence of an arbitration clause compared to the reference category,
merger contracts. Employment contracts and licensing agreements,
with relatively low degrees of standardization, are positively associ-
ated with the presence of arbitration clauses, compared to merger
contracts. Model (6) thus establishes that the coding of contract types
into our three standardization categories does not distort the relation-
ship between contract type and the presence of an arbitration clause.
Table 10's models also suggest that, of all the variables we explore,
most of the information about the presence of an arbitration clause is
embodied in the non-U.S. party variable, the choice of law variables,
and the standardization variables. In models (4) and (5), a test of the
hypothesis that the place of business dummy variables are jointly
equal to zero yields p-values that preclude rejecting the hypothesis.
Similarly, in model (5), one cannot reject the hypothesis that the attor-
ney locale dummy variables are jointly equal to zero.
The marginal effects of the explanatory variables for model (3) are
shown in Table 10's far right column. They report the estimated
change in the probability of the presence of an arbitration clause as an
explanatory variable changes from zero to one, while assigning the
84. Hylton's observation that loan contract provisions are clear and well understood by courts
is consistent with our standardizationi variables results, which suggest that more standardized
contracts are less likely to include arbitration clauses. Hylton, supra note 1.
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other explanatory variables their average values. The marginal effects
should be interpreted against the background of the small overall
probability, about 0.11, of an arbitration clause appearing in a con-
tract. So, for example, the 0.031 increase in the probability of an arbi-
tration clause when a non-U.S. party is present is about a 30%
increase in the probability of an arbitration clause, given the low rate
of arbitration clauses. From this perspective, all of the statistically sig-
nificant marginal effects are substantial, with the effect of high stand-
ardization being extraordinarily large at -0.157.
V. DISCUSSION OF RESULTS
This is the first study of its kind; it is thus important to recognize its
limitations. First, the contracts we study exist in a small slice of time,
so we would ideally like information for periods before and after the
first half of 2002. Second, the variation across the contract types in
the rates of arbitration clauses suggests that more sophisticated mod-
eling of the decision to include such clauses could be fruitful. The
details of the relationships between the contracting parties and the
motivations of those drafting the clauses could and should be studied.
Third, while corporate actors may be expected to seek efficient solu-
tions, they do act through agents. If litigation raises costs, some of
those costs go to attorneys who play a prominent role in drafting con-
tracts. The agency issues raised by our findings should be the object
of interesting research. Subject to these limitations, and recognizing
the need for future research, we explore some of the possible implica-
tions of our results.
A. The Paucity of Arbitration Clauses
The most striking result is the paucity of arbitration clauses, even in
international contracts. Our results contradict some received wisdom
but are consistent with the 1998 Cornell University survey finding that
relatively few large corporations use arbitration frequently, 85 and a
later Cornell survey finding substantial variation in corporate ap-
proaches to conflict resolution.8 6 The finding of greater use of arbitra-
tion clauses in employment contracts, as reported in Table 2 and
85. Stipanowich, supra note 3, tbl.19 at 880.
86. See generally DAVID B. LIPSKY ET AL., EMERGING SYSTEMS FOR MANAGING WORKPLACE
CONFLICT: LESSONS FROM AMERICAN CORPORATIONS FOR MANAGERS AND DISPUTE RESOLU-
TION PROFESSIONALS (2003); David B. Lipsky et al., An Uncertain Destination: On the Develop-
ment of Conflict Management Systems in U.S. Corporations, in ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE
RESOLUTION IN THE EMPLOYMENT ARENA: PROCEEDINGS OF NEW YORK UNIVERSITY 53RD
ANNUAL CONFERENCE ON LABOR 109 (Samuel Estreicher & David Sherwyn eds., 2004).
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confirmed in Table 10's regression models, is consistent with the Cor-
nell survey.87 The infrequency of arbitration in financial contracts
confirms the observation of William Park that banks prefer to litigate,
rather than arbitrate, loan defaults. 88
Our international contract arbitration clause findings show substan-
tial variation by contract type. The highest arbitration clause rate is
shown in Table 4 to be 63.6% for international licensing contracts.
This high rate suggests that our findings, although generally showing
low rates, are not necessarily inconsistent with Drahozal and
Naimark's reported 88.2% arbitration clause rate for international
joint venture agreements. 89 Both high rates are consistent with the
influence of standardization on the decision to include an arbitration
clause. Licensing and joint venture contracts are likely to be less stan-
dardized than most other contracts.
Why are arbitration clauses so infrequently used? The paucity of
such clauses may partially reflect the view of corporate counsel that
the decision whether to include binding arbitration in an agreement is
not one that can be made across the board, but rather depends on the
needs and circumstances of the parties.90 That arbitration is not called
for in every instance, however, would not explain why it is observed so
rarely. Perhaps the reason has something to do with education and
inertia; transactional attorneys may not be fully aware of the dispute
resolution options.91 But we doubt that the sophisticated attorneys
who draft these major commercial contracts would be unaware of the
availability of binding arbitration as an alternative to litigation. Par-
ties might be electing to omit arbitration clauses on the theory that if a
dispute arises, they can agree to submit the matter to arbitration at
that time. However, ex post arbitration is not an effective substitute
for arbitration agreed to ex ante; once a dispute has arisen, one party
87. Stipanowich, supra note 3, tbl.21 at 881 (citing Lipsky & Seeber, supra note 54, tbl.6 at 11).
88. William W. Park, Arbitration in Banking and Finance, 17 ANN. REV. BANKING L. 213,
215-16 (1998).
89. Commentary to Stephen R. Bond, supra note 65, at 59.
90. Brad S. Karp, The Litigation Angle in Drafting Commercial Agreements, 1459 PRACTISING
L. INST. CORP. L. & PRAC. COURSE HANDBOOK SERIES 343 (2004).
91. See Stipanowich, supra note 3, at 893 (observing that "[a]lthough 'trial lawyers' have often
had experience with mediation and other approaches, corporate transactional counsel tend to
have had little or no experience with these choices-and are reluctant or unable to incorporate
discussions about dispute resolution in commercial contract negotiations"); see also Celeste M.
Hammond, The (Pre)(As)sumed "Consent" of Commercial Binding Arbitration Contracts: An
Empirical Study of Attitudes and Expectations of Transactional Lawyers, 36 J. MARSHALL L.
REV. 589, 613 (2003) (stating that many transactional lawyers are unsure about the operation of
arbitration).
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will typically have a strategic reason to demand litigation. 92 Parties
may also encounter difficulty in proposing or negotiating a mutually
acceptable arbitration clause. A party may fear that proposing such a
clause will generate concerns about its intended contract performance
or about its perception of the other party's likelihood of performance.
Another plausible explanation is that the benefits of arbitration have
simply been oversold. Arbitration may not be as efficient a method
for resolving disputes as its most ardent supporters claim. 93
B. Arbitration Clause Rates and Perceptions of Court Fairness
Similarly, the disadvantages of litigation may have been exagger-
ated. One reason for shunning litigation is the supposed unpredict-
ability and unfairness of adjudication. If these reasons are in fact at
work, one might expect a strong association between the perceived
quality of state civil justice systems and the rate of arbitration clauses
in contracts connected to a state by incorporation or place of business.
Incorporating in a state and having a substantial place of business in a
state should be associated with an increased risk of adjudication in
that state's courts. Our data allow us to rank states based on the arbi-
tration clause rates of contracts connected to the states. The Chamber
of Commerce of the United States annually ranks state civil justice
systems.94 One measure of whether fear of state court systems ex-
plains arbitration clause rates is whether states that are perceived as
having the least fair court systems have the highest rates of arbitration
clauses.
Figures 2 and 3 show the relationship between a state's rate of arbi-
tration clauses and the overall ranking of state liability systems by
large corporations, as surveyed by the Chamber of Commerce. 95 The
Chamber's overall ranking is based on the scores for several topics, 96
92. See Shavell, supra note 1, at 9-10; supra note 35.
93. Stipanowich, supra note 3, at 894-95.
94. See, e.g., U.S. CHAMBER OF COM., STATE LIABILITY SYSTEMS RANKING STUDY: FINAL
REPORT STUDY No. 14966 (Jan. 2002), available at http:/www.instituteforlegalreform.com/
resources1012202.pdf [hereinafter U.S. CHAMBER OF COM., STATE RANKING]. The Chamber
and other business groups use the Chamber's ranking studies to try and influence courts to re-
strict causes of action and constrain legal actions against the business community. See, e.g., Brief
of the Chamber of Commerce of the United States et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of Defen-
dant-Appellant, Henry v. Dow Chem. Co., 701 N.W.2d 684 (Mich. 2005) (No. 125205); Amicus
Curiae Brief of Wisconsin Manufacturers and Commerce, Wischer v. Mitsubishi Heavy Inds.
Am., Inc., 673 N.W.2d 303 (Wisc. Ct. App. 2002) (No. 99-CV-6553). For prior use of the Cham-
ber's ranking in an empirical analysis, see Marcel Kahan, The Demand for Corporate Law: Stat-
utory Flexibility, Judicial Quality, or Takeover Protection?, 22 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 340, 348 (2006).
95. CHAMBER OF COM., STATE RANKING, supra note 94, tbl.3 at 14.
96. Id. at 8 n.1.
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including treat!,ent of tort and contract litigation, judges' impartiality,
judges'. competence, juries' predicta.biity, and juries' fairness.97 Fig-
ure 2 reports the relationship between arbitration clause rates in our
data based on state of incorporation and the Chamber's overall state
ranking. Figure 3 reports the relationship between arbitration clause
rates in our data based on place of business and the Chamber's overall
state ranking. Place of business for a contract is assigned as described
in connection with Table 7. Place of incorporation for a contract is
assigned using the same criteria. For example, in merger contracts,
the acquiring company's place of incorporation is used.
FIGURE 2. ARBITRATION CLAUSE RANK AND STATE LIABILITY
SYSTEM RANK (ARBITRATION CLAUSE RANK BASED ON
PLACE OF INCORPORATION)
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Source: U.S. CHAMBER OF COM., STATE LIABILITY SYSTEMS RANKING STUDY: FINAL REPORT
STUDY No. 14966 (Jan. 2002), available at http://wwwinstituteforlegalreform.com/re-
sources1012202.pdf; SEC EDGAR database, LEXIS EDGAR PLUS database, Jan. 2002 to June
30, 2002 for all contract types other than mergers and Jan. 2002 to July 31, 2002 for merger
contracts. Low numerical rankings in the Chamber's system correspond to more favorably
ranked state liability systems. We include states specified as a place of business in at least ten
contracts. The Chamber ranking for the remaining states is not included and the 26 included
states were re-ranked from 1 to 26. Ties in rank are not broken.
If there were a positive association between civil justice perceptions
and arbitration clauses, the data points in the figure should flow from
lower left to upper right. The lower left of the figures, near the origin,
97. Id. tbl.5 at 17-18. Other factors include treatment of class actions, punitive damages,
timeliness of summary judgment or 'dismissal, discovery, and scientific and technical evidence.
Id.
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FIGURE 3. ARBITRATION CLAUSE RANK AND STATE LIABILITY
SYSTEM RANK (ARBITRATION CLAUSE RANK BASED 'ON
PLACE OF BUSINESS)
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Source: U.S. CHAMBER OF COM., STATE LIABILITY SYSTEMS RANKING STUDY: FINAL REPORT
STUDY No. 14966 (Jan. 2002), available at http://wwwinstituteforlegalreform.com/re-
sources1012202.pdf; SEC EDGAR database, LEXIS EDGAR PLUS database, Jan. 2002 to June
30, 2002 for all contract types other than mergers and Jan. 2002 to July 31, 2002 for merger
contracts. Low numerical rankings in the Chamber's system correspond to more favorably
ranked state liability systems. We include states specified as a place of business in at least ten
contracts. The Chamber ranking for the remaining states is not included and the 26 included
states were re-ranked from 1 to 26. Ties in rank are not broken.
corresponds with high rankings in civil justice systems and low rank-
ings in arbitration clause rates.98 The upper right corresponds with
low rankings in civil justice systems and high rankings in arbitration
clause rates. The expected outcome is not observed. Both figures in-
dicate that no significant association exists between rates of arbitra-
tion clauses and the Chamber's rankings. The patterns appear to be
essentially random, though some caution is necessary because several
states have few observations. If the Chamber's ranking methodology
has validity, then the figures suggest that arbitration clauses are being
used for reasons other than perceived interstate variation in the per-
formance of the judicial system. 99
98. Low numerical rankings in the Chamber's system correspond to more favorably ranked
systems. Lower numerical rankings for arbitration clauses correspond to lower arbitration
clause rates.
99. In contrast to the absence of an association between use of arbitration clauses and the
Chamber's liability system ranking, we do find an associatioA between the use of jury trial waiver
clauses and the Chamber's ranking of the fairness of states' juries. Theodore Eisenberg & Geof-
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C. Arbitration Clause, Rates and State Laws and Courts
The associations between state contacts and the use of arbitration
clauses, shown in Tables 6, 8, 9, and 10, suggest the need for further
research into the relationship between state law and arbitration clause
use. One factor we suggested as possibly explaining use of arbitration
clauses, the speed with which state courts process cases, does not ap-
pear to be helpful in explaining the observed pattern of arbitration
clauses.
Available information about state court case processing indicates
that California cases resolved by trial are resolved more quickly than
New York cases. The Bureau of Justice Statistics studied all 2001 state
court trial terminations in forty-six of the nation's seventy-five largest
counties.100 The study included New York County (Manhattan) and
nine California counties.10' For the nine large California counties, the
study included 1264 trials. The mean time from trial to verdict was
601 days, with a median of 510 days. The large New York County had
309 trials, with a mean time from trial to verdict of 1245 days and a
median time of 1043 days. These dramatically faster disposition times
in large California counties persist when one controls for the different
mix of case types in the two states.
Thus, if contracting parties are attracted to arbitration in states in
which adjudication times are relatively slow, we would expect parties
entering contracts with New York ties to be attracted to arbitration
compared to parties entering contracts with California ties. Yet we
find just the opposite. Parties are drawn to arbitration more in Cali-
fornia than in New York. Indeed, California's processing time for
tried cases was noticeably faster than the forty-six county mean and
median. For all forty-six counties, the mean time from filing to verdict
was 753 days and the median was 629. Yet our data show that Califor-
nia contracts tend to include more arbitration clauses compared to
other states. We interpret this as evidence that substantive legal rules
tend to have a greater influence over decisions to include arbitration
clauses than case processing efficiency does.
frey P. Miller, Do Juries Add Value?: Evidence from an Empirical Study of Jury Trial Waiver
Clauses in Large Corporate Contracts (Cornell Law Sch. Legal Studies Research Paper Series,
Working Paper No. 06-044, 2006), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=946465 (showing an asso-
ciation between jury trial waiver rates and ranking of the fairness of juries).
100. For a summary of the data and methodology, see THOMAS H. COHEN, U.S. DEP'T OF
JUSTICE, TORT TRIALS AND VERDICrS IN LARGE COUNTIES, 2001 (2004), available at http://www.
ojp.usdoj.govfbjs/pub/pdf/ttvlcOl.pdf.
101. The California counties included were Alameda, Contra Costa, Fresno, Los Angeles, Or-
ange, San Bernardino, San Francisco, Santa Clara, and Ventura. Id. app. C at 12.
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D. Observed Arbitration Clause Rates Compared to
Consumer Contracts
Our core arbitration clause finding contrasts with the reportedly
widespread use of mandatory arbitration clauses in certain consumer
contracts.102 Business interests defend consumer arbitration as a
"less-expensive, more efficient alternative to a court dispute resolu-
tion."' 0 3 Some suggest that arbitration clauses in consumer contracts
may be used for some other purpose, such as a mechanism to avoid
dispute resolution by foreclosing class actions,10 4 or to gain an advan-
tage in dispute resolution over parties who cannot realistically negoti-
ate.10 5 Our study suggests the value of further inquiry into the
advantages and disadvantages of using binding arbitration in stan-
dardized consumer contracts.' 0 6
VI. CONCLUSION
We present evidence that large corporate actors do not systemati-
cally embrace arbitration. International contracts include arbitration
clauses more than domestic contracts, but also at a surprisingly low
rate. Our results have implications for the justifications for the wide-
spread use of arbitration clauses in consumer contracts. If the reasons
that some have advanced to support the use of arbitration in the con-
sumer context-that it is simpler and cheaper than litigation-are cor-
102. Consumer Reports observes that the largest credit card issuers "insist on arbitration."
ConsumerReports.org, Avoid Arbitration (Jan. 2004), http://www.consumerreports.orglcrol
personal-finance/avoid-arbitration-credit-card-creditcard-companies-madatory[sic]-arbitration/
index.htm. Consumer Reports also states that most community banks and credit unions that
issue credit cards do not require arbitration. Consumer Action similarly reports that 21 of 47
banks (45%) surveyed in 2005 required consumers to settle disputes using arbitration. Con-
sumer-Action, 2005 Credit Card Study Shines Light on Industry Practices (July 28, 2005), availa-
ble at http:/www.consumer-action.org/press/artices/new-credit-card-study-shines-light-on-
industry-practices/. On the other hand, in the perhaps unusual setting of software end-user li-
censing agreements, Marotta-Wurgler found an even lower rate of mandatory arbitration clauses
(6%) than is evidenced in our sample of sophisticated business contracts. Marotta-Wurgler,
supra note 50.
103. Marc Furletti, Mandatory Arbitration Clauses in the Credit Card Industry 1 (Jan. 2003)
(reporting on workshop led by Alan S. Kaplinsky, chair of the Consumer Financial Services
Group, Ballard Spahr Andrews & Ingersoll, LLP).
104. See generally Richard A. Nagareda, Aggregation and Its Discontents: Class Settlement
Pressure, Class-Wide Arbitration, and CAFA, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1872 (2006).
105. See generally Richard M. Alderman, Consumer Arbitration: The Destruction of the Com-
mon Law, 2 J. AM. ARB. 1 (2003).
106. Common sense and life experience with mobile phones suggest that disputes with mobile
phone suppliers exist. If arbitrations are very rare, even when they constitute the only available
dispute resolution mechanism, their scarcity may be evidence that arbitration clauses serve not
to efficiently resolve disputes but to shelter corporate conduct that might be challenged if a cost-
effective, aggregate dispute resolution mechanism was available.
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rect, it is surprising that public companies do not seek these
advantages in disputes among themselves. In the simple economic
view, our results suggest that corporate representatives believe that
litigation can add value over arbitration.
